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1. Introduction
In many industries, the importance of the R&D collaboration is rapidly increasing now a day,
because technologies have been more complicated and changed far more rapidly, market needs have
further upgraded, the variety of goods have increased substantially and product lifecycles have been
shortened drastically (e.g., Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Also knowledge for researching, developing
and commercializing new products has increased extremely (e.g., Badaracco, 1991). Consequently it is no
longer realistic for any one company alone to cover all product development processes, and moreover, it is
now essential for all companies to collaborate with others in order to improve the quality, to reduce the
cost, and to shorten the lead-time of R&D (e.g., Henderson and Cockburn, 1994).
The Japanese auto sector is one of the industries wherein inter-firm collaboration in product
development processes plays a key role. The typical passenger car contains 20,000 to 30,000 components.
As much as 70% of these components are provided by outside suppliers. These outside suppliers are often
involved in design as well as manufacturing and may account for 50% or more of engineering costs.
In addition, a car is a typical product for integral architecture. Functional and structural
interdependency is complicated between components comprising a car. The interfaces between these
components are not standardized. It is difficult to develop an excellent car without knowledge of the entire
car or individual components. In the Japanese auto industry, automakers accumulate knowledge on the
entire vehicle, while automotive suppliers store knowledge on individual components. When new
technologies or new-concept components are developed, automakers and suppliers must make joint
development arrangements in order to integrate their knowledge (e.g., Takeishi, 2003).
In this respect, numerous studies in Japan and abroad since the mid-1980s have drawn a conclusion
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2(e.g., Womack et al., 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994;
Dyer, 1996; Sako, 1996; Sako and Helper, 1998; Wasti and Liker, 1999): “Japanese automakers have
maintained their respective long-term cooperative business relations with a limited number of suppliers
and are conducting close information exchanges and coordination with them, based on their strong mutual
trust. Very close collaboration between automakers and their respective suppliers have covered even
product development processes. This is the source of the Japanese auto industry’s international
competitiveness.” Moreover, since vehicle development lead times have shortened, research and
development collaboration between automakers and their respective suppliers have been further enhanced
(e.g., Konno, 2002).
However, vehicle development projects are not limited to improvements in existing technologies.
They may include the development of advanced technologies for new-concept automotive components
and new elemental technologies (e.g., materials). This type of technology development is known as
advanced research and development (R&D). Advanced R&D of new technologies may precede or be
integrated with new vehicle development projects.
Some studies have mentioned that automakers and their respective suppliers cooperate closely even
for such advanced R&D activities (e.g., Ueda, 1995). However, most of the earlier studies analyzed
individual product development projects and discussed factors affecting them, such as development lead
times, development man-hours, and product quality, thereby failing to cover collaboration between
automakers and their respective suppliers in the development of advanced technologies. Some studies that
covered such collaboration were limited to qualitative analyses, lacking quantitative analyses.
Therefore, this paper first aims to specify the realities of recent collaboration between Japanese
automakers and their respective suppliers in the development of advanced technologies in a quantitative
manner. Second, this paper aims to generate and limitedly test hypotheses on the relationship between
suppliers' collaboration with automakers in advanced technology development and suppliers'
performances, focusing mainly on the suppliers’ transaction networks with customers (automakers).
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. First, in Section 2, we briefly review the related
literature to specify problems that this paper addresses. We analyze the realities of advanced technology
development collaboration, based on data of automakers' co-patent applications in Section 3, based on our
questionnaire survey data in Section 4. Section 5 generates hypotheses, and Section 6 tests the hypotheses
through a statistical analysis. Section 7 covers the conclusion and discussions.
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32. Literature Review
2.1. Studies on R&D Collaboration between Japanese Automakers and Their Respective Suppliers
A great number of empirical studies have found that the R&D collaboration management of Japanese
automotive industry had special features that wasn’t seen in other countries.
First of all, at least in the 1980’s, the in-house production ratio of Japanese automakers was
comparatively lower than those of US and European automakers. Also, the Japanese components suppliers
provided more parts development and design competency as compared to their US and European
counterparts. This played an important role in strengthening the Japanese automaker’s ability to design
and develop vehicles with less manpower and within a shorter timeframe.
For example, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) estimated that the more extensive involvement of suppliers
and the strong supplier relationships of Japanese automakers accounted for one-third of their advantage in
product development hours in the second half of the 1980s. They also statistically demonstrated that
suppliers also appeared to account for four to five months of the Japanese advantage in product
development lead-time.
Secondly, the Japanese automotive industry’s manufacturer-supplier business relationships tended to
be longer lasting, continuous, and cooperative. The Japanese automakers provided its respective suppliers
with detailed evaluation and technical guidance in both production technology and product technology.
Suppliers could expect stable, mid/long-term contractual relationships as well as some sort of technical
assistance from automakers. Therefore, they were able to safely make facility investment or strengthen the
R&D system, and they also tended to commit to reducing cost and improving quality on a long-term basis
for their clients.
For example, Asanuma(1989) and Cusumano and Takeishi(1991) shown that contracts between
Japanese automakers and first-tier suppliers tend to last as long as the production of the components in
question continue (usually until the next model change, or about four years). Furthermore, although there
are possibilities of competition for a new contract against other suppliers when model changes happen, the
relationship (i.e., a bundle of the contracts) with the automaker tended to last beyond the term of each
individual contract. In other words, for a given components category (e.g., lamp), the transactions of
suppliers for each automaker tended to be fairly stable for a long time.
Sako(1996), for example, shows that the Japanese suppliers participating in a suppliers' association
tend to make longer-range transactions with the automaker and invest more in R&D. She insisted, an
important mechanism that the Japanese automakers tend to utilize for technology transfer and information
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4sharing is the suppliers' association (kyoryoku-kai) organized by each Japanese assembler. Dyer and
Nobeoka(2000) also argued that Toyota's supplier association (Kyoho-kai) functions quite effectively in
information sharing, joint problem-finding and problem-solving.
Lastly, in Japan, automakers and suppliers also frequently exchanged information and often worked
together in resolving problems. Any modification in the final phase of a product development project
consumes far more time and cost than in the initial phase. Therefore, it is important for automakers to
have close communications with their suppliers from an early stage of projects and adopt suppliers' ideas
when fixing component specifications. In this respect, it was especially common for suppliers to take the
“Design-in” approach, in which they would dispatch their employees to client sites as “guest engineers”
who would participate in joint development projects. This close and frequent communication between
automakers and suppliers enabled them to identify and solve problems at an early stage of development,
which consequently resulted in high-quality production and development.
Instead of comparing automaker-supplier R&D collaboration in Japan, Europe and the United States,
Takeishi (2003) looked into differences between Japanese automakers regarding R&D collaboration. This
study found that the quality of the component design developed jointly by an automaker and a supplier is
related to three areas of the automaker's supplier management: problem-solving pattern, communication
pattern, and knowledge level. In particular, the automaker's early, integrated problem-solving process with
the supplier, frequent face-to-face communication between the automaker and the supplier, and the level
of architectural knowledge for component coordination by the automaker's engineers, all have a positive
effect on component design quality. The analysis has also further indicated that the automaker's integrated
problem-solving process with the supplier is related to effective internal coordination inside the
automaker's organization - within various engineering functions and between engineering and purchasing
functions, implying that effective external coordination needs effective internal coordination.
In short, Japanese automakers have outsourced R&D operations more aggressively than their U.S.
and European counterparts and have far closer communications with their respective suppliers for
developing new products. Such closer communications have allowed automakers and their respective
suppliers to find and solve problems in early stages, contributing much to improving their product
development performances and the Japanese automotive industry's international competitiveness.
2.2. A Definition of “Advanced Technology Development”
However, vehicle development projects are not limited to specific development projects for specific
car models. They include the development of advanced technologies for new-concept automotive
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5components and new elemental technologies. We define this type of development activities as “advanced
technology development.”
Generally, in practice, companies' R&D operations are divided into four phases -- "basic research"
for production of new scientific knowledge, "applications research" translating such knowledge into
prototypes for applicable technologies, "advanced development," and "product development" for
preparation of products for market sales and production processes. "Advanced development" is positioned
between the final portion of "applications research" and the initial portion of "product development,"
serving as a bridge between research and development divisions (Fujimoto, 2001). Even if laboratories1
in charge of basic and applications research produce excellent elemental technologies, these technologies
may usually have problems and be difficult to commercialize without additional efforts. Those
technologies often have to be upgraded through operations including the development of mass production
technologies for lowering production costs and of technologies for improving resistance to heat, vibration,
pressure, dust, water and oil, and so on. Covering these operations is “advanced development.”
In the Japanese auto industry, development operations before design approvals are also called
"advanced development" in practice (Fujimoto, 2001). In general, "advanced development" projects cover
not only the improvement of existing technologies but also the development of new-concept automotive
components and new elemental technologies (including new materials, devices 2 and production
technologies) and require significantly long lead times. Therefore, these projects are set to begin before
operations to design specific car models.
Such advanced development begins at various timings depending on components, technologies and
automakers. Roughly speaking, in many cases advanced development begins two to four years before
mass production of a specific vehicle and in other cases four to eight years before it. In the former case,
specific car model are set as goals for the advanced development operations. In the latter case, however,
advanced development is carried out based on the technology roadmaps, specific car models are not
necessarily set as goals.
The advanced development starts for four-to-eight-year goals, with below three cases; (1) engines,
transmissions, suspensions and other core components covering basic vehicle performances are concerned,
(2) major component changes (to modules or systems) are planned, or (3) large-scale materials changes
1 Applications and basic research bases for three leading Japanese automakers are Toyota Central R&D Labs., Inc. for
Toyota in Nagakute, Aichi Prefecture, the Research Center for Nissan in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, and the
Fundamental Technology Research Center of Honda R&D Co. for Honda in Wako, Saitama Prefecture.
2 Out of sub-parts of automotive components, electronic sub-parts (including semiconductors for controlling automotive
components) with specific functions are called "devices" in this paper.
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6are planned. R&D operations for technologies to be commercialized in more than eight years may be
classified as applications or basic research.
In practice, the concept of “advanced technology development” in this paper roughly corresponds to
“advanced development,” although strictly speaking the former covers some portions of basic and
application research. Hereinafter, the term of "advanced technology development" is treated as the same
as "advanced development."
2.3. Moves for Collaboration in Advanced Technology Development
Generally, management for collaboration in advanced technology development is far more difficult
than the outsourcing of ordinary “product development” activities. There are three reasons behind this.
First, in advanced technology development projects, the most serious concern for both parties
(automakers and suppliers) is “diffusion risk” or “knowledge spill-over risk” for the information
exchanged through collaboration partners. For example, if a certain multiclient supplier, although not
intentionally, leaks critical information about client A to client B, it could result in losing a technological
edge of client A over client B. In the automotive industry, suppliers that have developed new technologies
for automakers may have incentives to sell components containing these new technologies to other
automakers in order to promptly recover development costs. If automakers' new technologies swiftly
become available for their rivals through such sales promotion efforts by their suppliers, however, these
automakers' opportunity losses may be enormous3. As a matter of course, automakers may be able to
prevent technology spillovers by concluding NDA (Non-Disclosure Agreements) with their suppliers.
Even if parties signed NDA, however, it is difficult to prove illegal activity or wrongdoing on an objective
basis.
Furthermore, under joint technology development projects, it could be difficult for both parties to
evaluate each other's efforts or contributions. Automakers and their respective suppliers can develop new
useful technologies only by sharing cutting-edge technologies and know-how and by repeating trials and
errors while maintaining close exchange of information. As such process of knowledge transfer, fusion
and creation is interactive, very complex and invisible, it is extremely difficult to manage. In addition,
3 By the time a component is reverse engineered by competitors, a typical automaker will still be ahead in
product development time, typically by months, maybe even years. Since the development of a new vehicle
may take more than 18 months after a design approval, the first automaker may be expected to maintain
technological superiority for at least more than two years. However, critical information that leaks out to
competitors at the product development stage through suppliers utilizing the same or similar designs or
technologies for different customers causes that first automaker to face a steep loss in its first-mover
advantages.
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7even if an automaker and a supplier succeeded in generating new innovative technologies, it is difficult to
measure how much of the contribution was made by which party, or how much of the resulting profits
should be attributed to which party. This “measurement problem” is the second reasons.
Third, because of a high level of uncertainty in advanced technology development projects, both
parties could find it difficult to precisely forecast in advance what each of them need to do, to what extent,
and what level of resources need to be provided. Therefore, a change of plans is often inevitable, and with
them conflicts occur between the two parties.
In conclusion, it is very difficult for automakers and suppliers to control the advanced technology
development projects only through contracts. In order to have successful collaboration in advanced
technology development, “higher-level management of the inter-firm relationships” beyond the
contractual relationships is necessary. Building up strong mutual trust based on close communications
under long cooperative relations are firstly required, and making up a lot of co-routines for collaboration
such as guidelines for the way to manage project team across boundaries, to disclose technology and
know-how mutually, to revise a plan again, to negotiate the distribution of a result, and so on, are also
inevitable (e.g., Sako, 1992; Dyer, 1996).
Japanese automakers, however, have expanded their scope of collaboration with their suppliers into
advanced technology development activities. For example, Toyota Motor Corp. created the fourth
development center (run mainly by the Higashifuji Laboratory) in September 1992 to enhance advanced
development of elemental technologies for engines and electronics. Nissan Motor Co. opened the Nissan
Advanced Technology Center in May 2007 to consolidate and enhance advanced development functions.
Advanced development has also spread to cover collaboration between automakers and their
respective components suppliers. Some studies (e.g., Konno, 2002; Konno, 2004; Fujimoto, Ku, Konno,
2006; Konno, 2007a; Konno, 2007b) note that automakers and their respective components suppliers have
enhanced their collaboration in advanced development.
In the past, automakers and their respective components suppliers had given priority to management
of in upgrading component cost efficiency, quality and development lead times to satisfactory levels in
specific car model development projects. In contrast, collaboration between automakers and their
respective components suppliers at present has expanded to cover advanced development beyond specific
car model development projects. Advanced development itself has grown more important.
There are three factors behind the expansion of collaboration between automakers and their
respective components suppliers in advanced technology development.
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8The first factor is that new car development lead times have become even shorter. Japanese
automakers have been shortening lead times for new vehicle development again since the second half of
the 1990s (Nobeoka and Fujimoto, 2004). At present, the average lead time for new vehicle development
after design approvals is 18 to 20 months for full model changeovers or 10 to 12 months for derivative
models. Therefore, major technical problems must be solved before the commencement of new vehicle
development projects so that mainly adaptive designs are made in the product/process engineering phase
after design approvals. If not, components development may fail to fall within a lead time for the
development of new vehicle.
The second factor is that new materials development and introduction, downsizing and weight
reductions, computerization, information and other technological innovations have made fast progress
amid a rapid increase in development costs for automakers. Such fast progress in innovations has forced
automakers to cooperate with their respective components suppliers in the development of advanced and
alternative technologies excluding a limited range of core technologies.
For example, a lot of new modules and systems have been rapidly introduced. While components are
treated in spatially and physically larger units than in the past, moves have increased to functionally
integrate small parts within such units. New design concepts for components also have been proposed and
implemented one after another. In order to improve vehicles' basic functions (running, turning and
stopping), safety and comfortableness, automakers have tended not only to upgrade the performance of
the engine, braking, steering, suspension and other individual systems and individual parts but also to link
multiple relevant systems together. Furthermore, over the past decade, automakers have switched from
metallic materials to plastic materials, from steel to aluminum, and from conventional steel sheets to
high-tensile sheets in a bid to reduce vehicle weights and improve fuel efficiency.
The last factor is that a lot of leading automotive components suppliers have improved their R&D
capabilities recently. Many leading automotive components suppliers created laboratories or divisions for
basic research and advanced development in and after the first half of the 1980s. Regarding technologies
inherent to components, suppliers have generally outperformed automakers in research and development
capability.
As Konno(2008) shows, primary components suppliers' joint patents with automakers account for
only 5-10% of these components makers' total patent applications. The remaining 90-95% of components
makers' patent applications represent their independent R&D achievements. Furthermore, for example,
even Toyota has sent their employees as “guest engineers” to leading components markers. These indicate
component makers' excellent technological capability.
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9The development of new-concept components and of new technologies that are involved in them
may require fundamental changes in manufacturing methods, equipment and assessment standards as well
as designs. Therefore, massive time and resources must be put into R&D operations. Furthermore, a
process is required to well mix automakers' knowledge (architectural knowledge) about entire vehicles
with components makers' knowledge (component knowledge) inherent to individual components
(Takeishi, 2003). It is thus indispensable for automakers and their respective components suppliers to
collaborate in the development of advanced technologies while sharing cutting-edge technologies and
know-how (e.g. Konno, 2007a; Konno; 2007b).
2.4. Unexplored topics
As mentioned above, some studies have found that Japanese automakers and their respective
suppliers have cooperated even in advanced technologies operations that have grown more important in
the Japanese automotive industry. However, most of the past studies have limited their research coverage
to factors affecting development lead times, development man-hours and products quality regarding
specific development projects for specific products, such as the Mark X launched in 2007. Some studies
that covered collaboration between automakers and their respective component suppliers in advanced
technology development were limited to qualitative analyses, lacking quantitative analyses.
Therefore, this paper first aims to analyze as quantitatively as possible the reality of recent
collaboration between Japanese automakers and their respective suppliers in developing advanced
technologies. This paper will conclude that since collaboration between automakers and their respective
suppliers has been expanding into the development of advanced technologies, suppliers that have the
capability to participate in such development projects have developed closer relations with automakers
than others.
Second, this paper aims to generate and test hypotheses on the relationship between suppliers'
collaboration with automakers in advanced technology development and suppliers’ performances, based
on the inference from the "social network theory." This paper will conclude that suppliers that can
cooperate with their respective main customer automakers in advanced technology development, while at
the same time maintain business relations with a wide range of other customers, tend to outperform other
suppliers.
3. Analysis of Automakers’ Joint Patent Applications
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This section examines between automakers and their respective suppliers in the development of
advanced technologies through an analysis of automakers’ joint patent applications.
3.1. Data Source
In this Section, nine Japanese automakers’ patent applications that were filed to Japan’s Patent Office
over 12 years between 1993 and 2004 and released in the official patent gazette were subject to the
analysis. The nine automakers included Toyota Motor Corp., Nissan Motor Co., Honda Motor Co.,
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., Mazda Motor Corp., Suzuki Motor Corp., Daihatsu Motor Co., Fuji Heavy
Industries Ltd., and Isuzu Motors Ltd. Applicants (multiple applicants for one patent application are all
counted as applicants), publication numbers, application dates, names, international patent classification
(first invention information subclasses), inventors, and other patent application data were entered into a
spreadsheet software. Then, we conducted a patent map analysis of joint patents or patents for which
applications were filed jointly by automakers and their suppliers.
Joint patent applications are those for which both automakers and their respective suppliers are
applicants in connection with the development of advanced technologies that can be identified as novel or
inventive. Thus, joint patents represent inventions to which both automakers and their suppliers have
contributed4. Therefore, there may be small inaccuracies with the utilization of joint patent applications as
an indicator of successful advanced technology collaboration5.
3.2. Overview of Automakers’ Patent Applications
First, we would like to review the overall trend. Figure 1 indicates the total number of patent
4 Inventions subjected to patent applications are published in the official gazette 18 months after these
applications have been filed with Japan’s Patent Office. Applications enter an examination process only if
applicants request examination and pay examination fees. If novelty or inventiveness isn’t identified in
inventions, patents are not awarded. This means that patents are only awarded to a minor portion of patent
applications.
Many applications are filed for defensive purposes. Manufacturing know-how and other technologies that may
be difficult for rivals to imitate are not necessarily subject to patent applications. Due to these factors, there are
various limitations on using patent data for a performance index.
However, no alternative objective indicators exist for successful advanced technology development. Moreover,
since patent applications are filed at some cost, technologies subject to patent applications have probably been
screened by applicants and can be expected to feature some kind of novelty or inventiveness. In this sense,
patent data utilized as an indicator of successful advanced technology development may be permitted.
5 Multiple applicants for a single patent may not necessarily have made the same contributions to a particular
invention. The applicants often assess their respective contributions to an invention subject to their patent
application and agree on how to share gains from the patent, as “Toyota 70% and Denso 30%”. Although such
agreements is not apparent in patent application data, all applicants should have made some contribution to the
invention. In this sense, there may be small inaccuracies with the utilization of joint patent applications as an
indicator of successful advanced technology development collaboration.
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figure shows that the nine automakers’ total patent applications began to increase around 2002
d a sharp increase in 2004. Breaking down these patent applications by automaker, we find that
issan, and Honda account for a dominant share of the total. The three firms accounted for
ately 60%–70% of the nine automakers’ total patent applications. In 2004, the three firms’ share
0%. Patent applications from the others have been falling or leveling off. Thus, Toyota, Nissan,
da have effectively been leading the development of advanced technologies in the Japanese auto
rview of Automakers’ Joint Patent Applications
t, we would like to review the overall trend of patent applications filed jointly by automakers and
ective suppliers. Figure 2 indicates the total number of joint patent applications for the nine
rs and their share of total patent applications between 1993 and 2004.
re 2 shows that the total number of joint patent applications and the nine firms’ share of the total
plications have continued at a rough upward trend, although some fluctuations were observed for
rs. Notably, joint patent applications appear to have increased since the total patent applications
ne firms began to rise in 2002. The joint patent applications’ share of the total also indicates a
ward trend.
Figure 1: Patent Applications
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Figure 3 indicates the number of joint patent applications and the share of the total for the three
largest Japanese automakers—Toyota, Nissan, and Honda—between 1993 and 2004. This figure indicates
that Toyota features a greater number of joint patent applications and a higher share of the total patent
applications than the other two6.
Figure 4 indicates the number and percentage share of patent applications that each of the three
largest automakers filed jointly with two or more suppliers.
A patent application filed by three or more companies may represent not only dyad collaboration
between an automaker and one of its suppliers but also horizontal collaboration between suppliers. The
number and percentage share of such co-patents can be seen as an indicator of their tendency to
coordinate many large-scale advanced R&D collaboration projects that have to unite two or more different
component and elemental technologies. In this type of large-scale advanced technology development
collaboration, management is more difficult. Since suppliers who participate in it are not direct
competitors (technical expertise is different) but are potential competitors with each other, suppliers often
aren’t willing to share intellectual property to with other parties, resulting in a project failure.
This figure shows that Toyota features a far higher number and percentage share than the others for
joint patent applications involving three or more applicants. Of course, Toyota has mainly filed co-patents
with Toyota-affiliated suppliers such as Toyota Central R&D Labs. Inc., Denso Corp., and Aisin Seiki Co.
However, Toyota’s R&D collaboration partners have not been limited to its affiliates. Toyota has also
made aggressive efforts to coordinate many large-scale R&D projects that include two or more
non-affiliate suppliers. In one case, Toyota filed joint patent applications for some telecommunications
technologies in 1999 aiming to get a defect-standards with five other suppliers—three (Aisin AW Co.,
Denso Corp., Fujitsu Ten Ltd.) are Toyota-affiliated suppliers and two (Pioneer Corp. and Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co.) are non- affiliated suppliers.
In short, Japanese automakers have thus expanded collaboration with their respective suppliers into
the development of advanced technologies. Amid this general trend, Toyota has also made aggressive
efforts to coordinate the joint style advanced technology development projects that include two or more
suppliers and horizontal collaboration between suppliers. In terms of quantitative achievements through
such collaboration, Toyota has progressed far ahead of other Japanese automakers.
6 Figures 3 and 4 do not make adjustments for Toyota’s joint patent applications with Toyota Central R&D
Labs. Inc. and Honda’s joint applications with Honda R&D Co., although these R&D firms have personnel
exchanges with their respective parent companies and are positioned as consolidated subsidiaries forming a
component of their respective parents’ R&D divisions. This means there is some upward bias for these
companies. However, even if such adjustments are made, a conclusion here may remain unchanged.
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Figure 2: Joint Patent Applications of Nine Automakers and Their Share of the Total
Figure 3: Joint Patent Applications and the Share of the Total for Each Automaker
Figure 4: Joint Patent Applications Involving Three or More Applicants for Each Automaker
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4. Analyzing Suppliers’ Questionnaire Surveys
As indicated in the previous section, collaboration between automakers and their respective suppliers
in the development of advanced technologies has been expanding in the Japanese auto industry. In a bid to
examine how business relations between automakers and their respective suppliers have changed in line
with such expanding collaboration, we would like to analyze a questionnaire survey of first-tier
automotive suppliers that was conducted in November 2003 with Mr. Takahiro Fujimoto, a professor of
Tokyo University, and Mr. Ku Seunghwan, then assistant professor at Kyoto Sangyo University.
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urvey Data Sources and Outline
n the above questionnaire survey, we sent questionnaires to 340 first-tier automotive suppliers
g the members of the Japan Auto Components Industries Association. Of these, 150 firms returned
nses, resulting in a response rate of approximately 44.1%.
n the questionnaire, the suppliers were first requested to select their most important product
onent). Then, they were asked about their business relations with their main customer automaker
ing their most important product (component). The components chosen as the most important are
over seven categories: subassembly components, electronic/electrical components, machining
ssing components, press components, plastic components, metals (molding/casting) components,
thers. Of the total, subassembly components accounted for 19%; press components, 17%, and
onic and electrical components, 14%. The main customer automaker mentioned by the questionnaire
ndents were Toyota (40%), Nissan (15%), Honda (14%), Mitsubishi (7%), and Matsuda (7%). These
ntages roughly represent their respective domestic auto production shares.
Figure 5: Outline of Component Transactions (1)
(1) Most important component of the respondents
(2) Main customer automaker (“A” automaker) of the respondents
19.3 14.0 12.0 17.3 12.7 4.7 18.0 2.0
Subassembly
component
Electronic/electrical component
Machining processing
component
Press component
pPastic
component
Metals component
Others No answer
（n = 150）
Toyota Nissan Honda
Mitsubishi
Mazda Suzuki
Daihatsu
Fuji
Isuzu
Hino
Nissan
Diesel
40.0 15.3 14.0 6.7 7.3 2.7
0.7
4.0 6.0
2.0
0.7
0.7
（n = 150）
No answer
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Of the suppliers, 58% stated that they “undertook more than half of the development workload”
themselves. When queried on the change in the percentage over the past four years, 56% responded that
they observed an upward trend. These results reveal that many suppliers are responsible for a rather high
ratio of the component development.
With regard to the suppliers’ transactions with automakers, 69% belonged to the “approved drawing
components7 ,” 17% belonged to the “assigned drawing components8 ,” and 10% belonged to the
“detailed-controlled drawing components9.” “Supplier proprietary components” were subjected to 3% of
these transactions. These data indicate that suppliers participated in detailed engineering as part of the
development of components in more than 86% (combining the approved drawing components and
assigned drawing components) of the total transactions.
With regard to competition, 67% of the responding suppliers stated that they were selected by
development competitions. Some 23% stated they received exclusive orders from automakers. The
remaining 11% cited biddings.
The respondents were also requested to select the most important capability from the five alternatives
for winning a competition. The most important capability, selected by 53%, was proposing and
developing new component technologies or new-concept components beyond the improvement of existing
technologies. The second most important capability, selected by 23%, was lowering costs through
manufacturing process improvements. The third, selected by 17%, was reducing costs through design
improvements. The fourth, selected by 4%, was developing components in accordance with specifications
provided by automakers. The fifth, selected by 3%, was guaranteeing quality and just-in-time delivery.
7 Under the approved drawing components’ practice, a supplier conducts detailed engineering based on rather
rough specifications provided by the customer automaker. After the automaker approves the drawings, the
supplier owns the final drawings and produces components based on it for delivery to the automaker. See
Asanuma (1989) and Fujimoto (1999).
8 Under the assigned drawing components practice, a supplier conducts detailed engineering based on the
customer automaker’s basic drawing. The automaker owns the final drawing. This type of component is
positioned between the approved drawing components and the detailed-controlled drawing components. See
Fujimoto (1999).
9 Under the detailed-controlled drawing components practice, an automaker undertakes detailed engineering
for a component. Further, the automaker owns the final drawing and presents it to a supplier for production. See
Asanuma (1989) and Fujimoto (1999).
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Figure 6: Outline of Component Transactions (2)
Decrease
3.6
2.7 2.7
36.3 42.3 14.1
2.0
1 2 3 4 5 No answer
(No change)
Increase Average
（n = 150）
20%-30% 50%-60% 80%-90%
（n = 150） 9.3 6.7 6.0
1.3
4.7
4.0
9.3 14.2 13.3 6.717.3
0%-10%
10%-20%
30%-40%
40%-50% 60%-70%
70%-80% 90%-100% No answer
(1) Amount of development workload that the respondents undertook
(2) Change in this ratio over the last 4 years
(3) Type of component transaction
(4) Type of competition
(5) Most important capability
10.0 16.7 69.3 2.71.3
Detailed-controlled
drawing component
Assigned drawing component Approved drawing component
Supplier proprietary component
（n = 150）
No answer
Development competition Exclusive ordersBidding
No answer 0.7
(n = 150) 9.9 67.4 22.010.7 67.3 21.3
23.4 2.8 17.7 4.3 51.122.7 2.7 17.3 4.0 52.7 0.7
No answer
(n = 150)
Proposing and developing new component
technologies or new-concept components
beyond improvement in existing technologies
Lowering costs through
manufacturing process
improvements
Reducing costs
through
design
improvements
Developing components in
accordance with specifications
given by automakers
Guaranteeing quality and
just-in-time delivery
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garding the relationship with a main customer automaker, 63% of the responding suppliers selected
d to participate in development activities from a much earlier stage than before,” 43% selected “We
ncreased the number of onsite guest engineers who work at the main customer automaker,” 62%
d “Face-to-face communication during the development process increased,” and 75% selected
was more frequent overall communication (includes all forms of communication—emails, phone
and face-to-face).” These results suggest that the relationship between suppliers and their main
er automakers is becoming tighter and closer with regard to R&D activities.
the recent Japanese auto industry, as indicated above, major suppliers have deepened relations
heir main customer automakers. Meanwhile, in order to survive fierce competition, suppliers are
d to have the capability to develop new cutting-edge components or technologies beyond
ements in existing technologies.
Figure 7: Outline of Component Transactions (3)
(1) Change in relationship with “A” automaker over the last four years,
a. Participation has begins
much earlier stage
b. Increased number of
onsite guest engineers
c. Increased face-to-face
communication
d. More frequent overall
communication
63.3
42.7
61.3
75.3
3.7
3.5
3.6
3.8
0.7
0.0
34.7 54.0 9.3 1.3
0.7
4.7
50.7 33.3 9.3 1.3
1.3
3.3
32.0 55.7 6.01.3
1.3
1.3 22.7 64.7 10.7 1.3
12 3 4 5
Average
Percent
age of
4 + 5
-ve +ve
(No change)
（n = 150）
4.2. Stages for R&D
Next, we would like to examine the reality of collaboration in the development of advanced
technologies.
Responses to Question 1 on the stages for R&D collaboration with a major customer automaker or
receiving assistance from such collaboration are compiled in Figure 8. Of the total responding suppliers,
23% selected “Stages for R&D into new-concept components or modules, or new elemental technologies
(such as new materials), including pilot studies on technologies that are not planned for specific models”;
43% selected “Stages for R&D of components for specific models, including new technologies or
concepts beyond improvements in existing technologies or products”; 28% selected “Stages for R&D of
components based on improvements in existing products”; 3% selected “No help from the main customer
automaker or no participation in the automaker’s R&D projects”; and 1% for “Others.” Based on
discussions in Section 2, the advanced technology development collaboration is identified for the first and
second cases.
And when queried about any change in the timing of starting collaboration over the past four years,
63% stated that they began to cooperate with the main customer automakers at an earlier time than in the
past.
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Figure 8: Stages for R&D Cooperation
(1) Timing of participation in joint R&D project/gaining technical cooperation
with “A” automaker
(2) Change in this ratio over the last four years
1. Stages for R&D into new-concept components
or modules or new elemental technologies
（n = 150） 23.3 42.7 28.0 4.0 1.3
No answer
2. Stages for R&D of components for specific Models,
including new technologies or concepts
5. Others (0.7)
4. No help from the main customer automaker
or no participation in the automaker’s R&D projects
3. Stages for R&D of components based on
improvements in existing technologies
0.7
2.7 28.7 52.7 10.0
1 2 3 4 5
Later
(No change)
Earlier
3.7
Average
（n = 150） 5.2
Consequently, a majority of suppliers are now cooperating with their respective customer automakers
even in the development of advanced technologies at an earlier time than before.
4.3. R&D and Inter-firm Relations
Next, we used the questionnaire survey data to consider any differences between suppliers that
cooperate and those thadvanced technology developmento not cooperate with the main customer
automakers in the development of advanced technologies.
The s
automaker
automaker
regard to a
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(1%) than
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latter, a f
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uppliers’ average workload portion of their joint R&D operations with their main customer
s was significantly higher (the significance level at 1% in t-test) for suppliers cooperating with
s in advanced technology development than for those refraining from such collaboration. With
ny change in such workload portion over the past four years, the former (suppliers cooperating
akers in advanced technology development operations) pointed to a more significant expansion
the latter (those refraining from such collaboration). With regard to relations with main
utomakers, the former feature collaboration in earlier R&D stages (1%) as compared to the
aster increase (5%) in face-to-face communications, a faster increase (5%) in overall
Figure 9: Advanced technology R&D Cooperation and Business Relations
(2) The change in the relation over the last four years
3.8
3.8
3.7
3.3
3.5
3.4
3.6
3.63.2
-ve +ve
(No change)
1 2 3 4 5
3.9
(1) Development workload portion of the respondent with “A” automaker
“No”
Average
“Yes”
Average
65.3％46.8％
%
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
（n = 138）
（n = 138）
（n = 147）
（n = 147）
（n = 146）
（n = 147）
a. Development workload
portion of the respondent
b. Timing of participation has
become much earlier
c. Increased number of
on-site guest engineers
d. Increased face-to-face
communication
e. More frequent overall
communication
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communications, and a greater expansion (1%) in onsite guest engineers stationed at automakers. These
data suggest that suppliers cooperating with automakers in advanced technology development operations
have closer relations with automakers than those refraining from such collaboration.
4.4. Suppliers’ Capabilities and collaboration with Automakers in Advanced Technology Development
Next, we would like to examine the relationship between suppliers’ capabilities and their
collaboration with automakers in advanced technology development activities.
From the resources-based view of the firm, the core elements of resources and capabilities
thadvanced technology developmentefine corporate competitive advantage are knowledge and know-how
accumulated in the companies (e.g., Teece et al., 1997; Barney, 1997). This may mean that the higher the
knowledge and know-how accumulated in a supplier, the more likely it is for that supplier to be permitted
to participate in advanced technology development. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
The greater the knowledge and know-how accumulated in a supplier, the more likely it is for that
supplier to be permitted to participate in advanced technology development.
We have utilized the abovementioned supplier questionnaire survey data for verification. As
incomplete responses were excluded from the data, the number of samples or responding suppliers for this
analysis came to 145.
As an indicator of advanced technology development collaboration as a dependent variable of the
working hypothesis, we have constructed a dichotomous variable—“1” for the first and second responses
to “Question 1” in Section 4.2 and “0” for the third and fourth responses. One respondent selected the fifth
alternative (“Others”) and was excluded from the samples because no details were provided.
As for the suppliers’ knowledge levels as the defining variable, “component-specific knowledge” is
separated from “architectural knowledge”, based on Takeishi (2003)10. For control variables, we have
used the “technology change” for controlling changes in the relevant component technologies, the
“external interdependency” for controlling the external architecture characteristics of relevant components,
and the “internal interdependency” for controlling the internal architecture characteristics of the
components, based on earlier studies such as Takeishi (2003), Nobeoka (1999), and Han (2002). For
details including original questions that constitute variables, see Table 1.
The logit analysis has been used for the verification of the hypothesis since the explained variable is
10 “Component-specific knowledge” is the knowledge of performances, costs, and production processes for
specific components. “Architectural knowledge” is the knowledge of the coordination of components that are
structurally and functionally related to each other (Takeisihi, 2003).
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a dichotomous variable. Table 2 indicates averages of major variables, standard deviations, and the
correlation matrix. Table 3 shows the results of the logit analysis.
First, Model 1 of Table 3 indicates that the suppliers’ component-specific knowledge has a positive
effect on their collaboration with automakers in advanced technology development. The effect is observed
at a 10% significance level. This means that the working hypothesis has been supported in regard to
component-specific knowledge. Second, the model indicates that component-specific knowledge is more
important than architectural knowledge for suppliers to be permitted to collaborate with automakers in
advanced technology development. Architectural knowledge is thus insignificant. Third, the model also
indicates that the technology change as a control variable has a positive effect at a 1% significance level
and the external interdependency has a positive effect at a 5% significance level. These indications mean
that the faster the technology change and the more interdependent the components compared to others, the
higher is the probability for suppliers to be permitted to cooperate with automakers from the advanced
technology development stage. This finding is an interesting theme for future study.
Thus, these results suggest that suppliers that are identified as having relatively higher-level
component-specific knowledge and the capability to develop advanced technologies or new components
beyond improvements in existing technologies are more likely than other suppliers to have cooperated
with automakers from the advanced technology development stage and have eventually developed closer
business relations with automakers.
4.5. Progressive practice of Toyota’s Suppliers
The analysis in Section 3 found that Toyota has progressed ahead of other Japanese automakers in
collaboration with suppliers in the development of advanced technologies. Therefore, this subsection
examines the differences between suppliers whose main customer automaker is Toyota (Toyota’s
suppliers) and the other suppliers.
Figure 10 shows a comparison of the responses provided by Toyota’s suppliers and the others to
“Question 1” in Section 4.2. Of Toyota’s suppliers, those in the first category accounted for more than
35%. This percentage more than doubled the level for the other suppliers. Of Toyota’s suppliers, those in
the second category also accounted for more than 35%. This percentage is slightly lower than that for the
other suppliers; however, a combination of the first and second categories for Toyota’s suppliers was 16.2
percentage points higher than for the other suppliers. The difference between Toyota’s suppliers and the
others was at a 1% significance level.
Model 2, in which a Toyota dummy is added to Model 1 of Table 3, indicated the Toyota dummy’s
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positive effect at a 5% significance level even after all the other variables were controlled. Moreover,
Model 2 indicated that the addition of the Toyota dummy improved the regression’s explanation power. In
short, Toyota’s suppliers are more likely than the others to participate in the main customer’s advanced
technology development projects. The probability gap was calculated at approximately 36 percentage
points.
In this way, Toyota’s joint R&D operations with major suppliers from the advanced technology
development stage are more aggressive than the other automakers.
 Hosei University Repository
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Table 1: Explanations of Variables
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and the Correlation Matrix of Major Variables
Table 3: Logit Analysis Results
Variable Specification Note
Participation in the
advanced technology
development
The dichotomous variable is set at
"1" for Alternatives 1 or 2 of the
five listed on the right side and at
"0" for Alternatives 3 or 4.
Question: In what stage of component R&D operations at the major customer automaker do you
participate or gain help from the customer? (Choose one alternative)
1. Stages for R&D into new-concept components or modules, or new elemental technologies (such
as new materials), including pilot studies on technologies that are not planned for specific models
2. Stages for R&D of components for specific models, including new technologies or concepts
beyond improvements in existing products.
3. Stages for R&D of components based on improvements in existing products.
4. No help from the main customer automaker or no participation in the automaker’s R&D projects
5. Others (Specifically: )
Component-specific
knowledge
Average score of responses to 10
right questions
Question: What is your estimated level of knowledge about the following points compared to the
levels for automakers? (A five-point Likert scale for each question)
a. Functional design b. Structural design c. Material design d. Durability design
e. Core technology f. Manufacturing process g. Quality control h. Manufacturing cost i. Material
cost j. Components cost
Architectural
knowledge
Average score of responses to 8
right questions
Question: What is your estimated level of knowledge about the following points compared to the
levels for automakers?
a. Final customers’ needs and preferences regarding Component X (main component)
b. Automakers’ manufacturing processes (particularly, availability for assembling)
c. Functional coordination with other components
d. Structural coordination with other components
Question: What is your estimated level of knowledge compared to the levels for automakers about
the following points regarding “other components” linked closely to Component X?
a. Knowledge of engineering
b. Knowledge of production
c. Knowledge of evaluation
d. Knowledge of costs
Technology change
Score of responses to the right
question
Question: How do you evaluate the following item in comparison with other components in
general?
a. Technological changes are fast
External
interdependency
Total of the following scores of
responses to right questions:
External interdependency = -a-b-
c+d-e+f
Question: How do you evaluate the following items in comparison with other components in
general?
a. External interfaces are standardized within the company.
b. External interfaces are standardized within the industry (adopted at two or more companies).
c. Component X functions independently (can be designed without considerations to functions of
other components)
d. Component X functions multidimensionally.
e. Component X is structurally independent (can be designed without considerations to structures of
other components).
Internal
interdependency
Total of the following scores of
responses to right questions:
Internal interdependency = g+h
Question: How do you evaluate the following items in comparison with other components in
general?
g. If a subcomponent design is modified, most other subcomponent designs must be modified.
h. If a mix of materials is modified even slightly for Component X, the production method and
production process conditions (pressure, temperature, timing, time, procedures, etc.) must be
modified considerably.
Toyota dummy
A dummy variable set at 1 for
Response 1 of responses to right
questions and 0 for any other
response
Question: What is you main customer automaker? (Choose one)
1. Toyota 2. Nissan 3. Honda 4. Mitsubishi 5. Mazda 6. Suzuki 7. Daihatsu
8. Fuji 9. Isuzu 10. Hino 11. Nissan Diesel 12. Others
Variable AV SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Participation in the advanced technology development 0.67 0.47 1.00
2 Component-specific knowledge 3.80 0.61 0.23 1.00
3 Architectural knowledge 2.97 0.67 0.06 0.22 1.00
4 Technology change 3.43 0.79 0.28 0.14 0.07 1.00
5 External interdependency -4.57 3.21 0.24 0.01 -0.11 0.18 1.00
6 Internal interdependency 6.77 1.52 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.04 1.00
7 Toyota dummy 0.39 0.49 0.15 0.01 -0.11 -0.19 0.03 -0.06 1.00
If the absolute value of a correlation coefficient≧0.22 then it is significant at the 1% level，and if the absolute value is ≧0.18 then it is significant at the 5% level.
Model
Explained variable
β S.E. p β S.E. p
Component-specific knowledge 0.52 0.30 0.08 0.49 0.30 0.10
Architectural knowledge 0.13 0.27 0.63 0.19 0.28 0.49
Technology change 0.65 0.26 0.01 0.80 0.27 0.00
External interdependency 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.07 0.02
Internal interdependency -0.05 0.13 0.71 -0.03 0.13 0.81
Toyota dummy 1.02 0.43 0.02
Constant term -2.76 1.55 0.08 -3.81 1.65 0.02
-2logL
Negelkerke R2
Sample size
A yellow cell means p < 0.10
Participation in the advanced technology development
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145
162.9
0.19 0.24
145
156.9
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eses
ection, based on the knowledge as mentioned above, generates and limitedly tests hypotheses
tionship between suppliers' collaboration with automakers in advanced technology development
ers’ performances.
nce from the “Social Network Theory”
of past literature focused on the cooperative nature of dyadic inter-firm relationships between
s and suppliers in Japan. It has been said that Japanese automakers are inclined to have
and collaborative relationship with restricted number of components suppliers, which have been
as “Keiretsu System.” However, some researches indicate that such kind of exclusive image of
System” is wrong. On average, each Japanese automaker procures each component from a
mber of suppliers, and each supplier sells the same component to a certain number of
s (e.g., Takeishi and Cusumano, 1995; Fujimoto, 1999; Nobeoka, Dyer, and Madhok, 2002).
in the Japanese automotive industry, there is a complicated network of inter-firm relationships
of multiple automakers and component suppliers.
ermore, Japanese automotive industry of today has been struck by an unprecedented tide of
reform reflecting slowdown in automotive demand and sharp rise of oversea production.
re shifting from a situation depending on a specific automaker for most of sales but trying to
Figure 10: Differences between Toyota’s Suppliers and the Others
0 10 20 30 40 50
％
Toyota's suppliers
The other suppliers
1. Stages for R&D into new-concept
components or modules or new
elemental technologies
2. Stages for R&D of components for
specific models, including new
technologies or concepts
3. Stages for R&D of components
based on improvements in existing
technologies
4. No help from the main customer
automaker or no participation in the
automaker’s R&D projects
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extend their customer base. Therefore, we regard the entire pattern of Japanese automakers-suppliers
relationship not as one-to-one structure but a kind of network form.
The "social network theory" is highly suggestive for us to consider how such component transaction
network would affect suppliers' performances. The social network theory has many points, however, one
of its core points is that actors’ actions and outcomes are substantially influenced by the ongoing pattern
of relationships maintained with other actors. In particular, a network in which an actor is embedded
potentially provides it with access to information, resources, markets, and technologies (e.g., Powell,
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Uzzi, 1996). This means that the configuration of a network in which an
actor is embedded -- (1) what network the actor forms along with other actors and (2) what position the
actor takes in the network -- can define the quality and quantity of information the actor acquires and
influence its behaviors, resources, capability-building processes and performances (e.g., Gulati, 1998).
There are two major views about what network configuration is desirable for actors. Kogut (2000)
used the concept of "rent" to explain benefits that certain network configurations would bring about and
modeled the rents emerging from two different representative network configurations. One is the
“Coleman rent” that stems from a network where members are closely and directly linked to each other.
Since a small number of actors linked closely to each other in such network configuration develop mutual
confidence, common standards and routines for solving problems, their exchange of fine-grained
information and implicit knowledge can be promoted to produce the rent. Another is called the “Burt
rent,” which emerges from a network including a large number of members linked indirectly to each other.
Such network configuration contains a great number of “structural holes” - the positions between other
actors who are not directly linked-, therefore allows members to have contact with a diverse range of
actors and acquire additional new non-redundant information, producing the rent.
Although the two network configurations seemingly differ much from each other, the information
acquiring from different network configurations is characteristically different and favorable for different
purposes (e.g., Rowley, Beherens, and Krackhardt, 2000; Ahuja, 2000). If so, there is no contradiction
between them. In fact, Burt (2001) said a combination of the two network configurations can maximize
actors' performances. This means that an actor should have close contacts with a small number of actors in
order to acquire fine-grained information or implicit knowledge, while at the same time should have
relations with a wide range of diverse actors in order to acquire additional new non-redundant
information.
This inference gives very important implications for an analysis of the relationship between auto
 Hosei University Repository
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components transaction network and suppliers' performances. Given the above discussions, suppliers that
have developed close business relations with a limited range of customers, while at the same time
maintained some relations with a wide range of customers, can be expected to acquire substantial
fine-grained and non-redundant information and achieve excellent performances.
Next, this inference will be developed into hypotheses for the Japanese automotive components
industry.
5.2. Defining Auto Parts Transaction Network Configurations
Network configurations are usually measured by the number of nodes (actors), the number of ties
between nodes, their density and the like. But this paper attempts to define auto parts transaction network
configurations by two factors -- (1) “the relationship between a certain supplier and its main customer
automaker” and (2) “diversification of a certain supplier’s customer base (the scope of customers in which
the supplier deals with).”
The "social network theory" suggests, if network configurations are different, gaps may emerge
between actors in the quality and quantity of information they obtain and in their performances. Given the
above discussions, suppliers that have developed close business relations with a main customer automaker,
while at the same time maintained some relations with a wide range of customers, can be expected to
acquire substantial fine-grained and non-redundant information and achieve excellent performances.
In the following section, this assumption is put into a real context to generate more specific
hypotheses.
5.3. Business Relationships between Suppliers and Their Main Customers
Definitely, information, which is passed on from automakers who are customers to their supplier, plays
a major role in the suppliers’ performance. In fact, it is commonly observed to have automakers supervise
suppliers on product management and quality control. On the other hand, it is often seen among suppliers
to receive technical experts from partner automakers or send their own engineers to customer automakers
for training. Moreover, it is crucial for suppliers to gain information, directly and indirectly, through daily
transactions, about technical trends, rivals’ actions, and up-to-date needs of automakers and consumers.
In addition, as noted in Sections 3 and 4, major Japanese automakers have growingly tended to
closely cooperate with their respective main suppliers in new vehicle development projects from their
initial phases. Participating in advanced technology development projects has become decisively
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important for suppliers in accumulating technological know-how11.
Most important in learning from customers is the relationship with the main customer, in this case the
automaker. Virtually, suppliers’ contacts are most frequent with main customers, and main customers’ job
priorities are higher. It is common that product development projects aimed at main customers play a
major role in building up new core products or production systems. Hence, learning from main customers
has a much larger influence on the supplier’s performance than learning from other customers.
However, even when automaker B is the main customer for supplier A, this does not simply allow
supplier A to draw significantly valuable information from automaker B. Among Japanese car
manufacturers, each auto component is usually procured from more than one supplier, and in doing so
they refer to a list in which suppliers are rated in detail by competence and background. As for automakers,
especially in advanced technology development projects where highly confidential information needs to
be shared, their tendency is stronger to partner-up with their core suppliers. Therefore, as long as supplier
A is not treated as a core supplier by automaker B, A will hardly gain valuable information from B:
Advantages gained through learning from a main customer will be reserved.
On the contrary, when tight relationships between automakers and suppliers are maintained, in which
both companies regard each other as a main partner, trust grows and opportunistic breach of information
becomes unlikely: Information of higher confidentiality can be exchanged. Thus, suppliers regarded as
important by main customers take more advantage of the learning process compared with suppliers that
are not.
As for this point, the analysis in Section 4.2 indicates "a supplier’s participation in automakers'
advanced technology development" is a key explanatory factor for deciding whether a suppliers is
regarded by its main customer as a core partner. Thus, a supplier who can participate in their main
customer’s advanced technology development projects tends to enjoy relative high performance.
5.4. Customer Scope
Another thing that is important with regard to a supplier’s performance is to broaden the scope of
11In developing component technologies, suppliers usually collaborate with automakers more or less, instead of
implementing R&D operations independently. The biggest reason for such collaboration is that automakers'
knowledge and know-how (“architectural knowledge”) are indispensable for the development of component
technologies. Another major reason is the reduction of testing costs. Even if a supplier alone conducts the
advanced R&D operations of auto components, these components will have to be installed on real vehicles for
various tests before their certification and commercialization. Because such tests cost much, it isn’t realistic for
suppliers to shoulder all such huge costs. Therefore, it is important for suppliers to take part in automakers'
vehicle development projects and have these automakers shoulder reasonable portions of testing costs.
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customers.
First, this is because dealing with many numbers of automakers would allow suppliers access to
much non-redundant information, compared to suppliers who limit the number of customers. Additionally,
developing and producing virtually the same components for different automakers will engage more
numbers of test runs and improvement activities during product design and production design procedures,
thus quite possibly increasing the learning effect and experience effect of the supplier.
Suppliers may also take advantage of transactions with a wide range of automakers to acquire diverse
technological information. As many technological innovations have been achieved in the auto components
industry over recent years, suppliers have been faced with growing uncertainties about technology
development. If suppliers deal only with a limited range of automakers, they may become preoccupied
with views of these automakers and fail to make correct forecasts about future technologies.
Second, experiencing numerous customer dealings would increase the ability of “knowledge
transfer” in suppliers. Generally, with some exceptions, it is not easy to develop, produce and deliver auto
components to different automakers without modification, even with the same components. Therefore, in
order to transfer knowledge gained through dealings from one customer to another, it is critical to adapt
the knowledge to different contexts. Such process involves much questioning and learning-by-doing of
“what can be used from knowledge already gained and what ought to be changed,” and more transactions
offer suppliers more learning opportunity in this matter.
Third, we must consider “learning bias”. When suppliers are depending too much on transactions
with a specific automaker, suppliers are apt to overestimate their own competence, naturally because the
opportunity to gain objective information needed to comprehend their competence is scarce.
Moreover, among various activities going on in a firm, most are repeated and form patterns. Through
continuous repetition, activities which proved to be successful are selected and accumulated within the
firm as “organizational routine”; such being standard procedures, computer programs, pattern of
communication, various know-how, and so on. Generally speaking, in auto components transactions,
suppliers repeat problem-solving in efforts to meet the demands of customer automakers, to accumulate
successful cases and form routine. Routine allows higher efficiency of operation, however, if the
suppliers’ learning opportunities are reserved to few customer dealings, it would bias the learning process.
This is because the supplier might put too much strength on learning the knowledge and experience useful
in dealing with the main customer alone and neglect other learning.
In fact, suppliers can increase opportunities to obtain information for their objective assessment of
their real strengths in the industry by dealing with a wide range of automakers. A supplier thadvanced
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technology developmentelivers components to multiple automakers can grasp levels of its technological
capability, quality, cost and delivery in the industry by comprehending customers' assessments. This kind
of information is extremely important for suppliers to decide on priority areas to which their limited
business resources should be allocated.
Likewise, learning bias might occur in “basic corporate behavior principles.” Suppliers who restrict
business to specific limited numbers of customers in the long run may possibly narrow down and get
stuck to one idea of what they regard as business opportunity.
Thus, we believe that a supplier’s performance is improved through business relations with a variety
of automakers.
5.5. Mutually Complementing Relationship between “Supplier’s Participation in their Main
Customer’s advanced technology development projects” and “Customer Scope”
We further expect that, from the discussions in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, suppliers’ importance in main
customers’ eyes and the scope of customers are mutually complementing. In other words, meeting either
one alone would be insufficient.
Thus, from the above discussion, we can derive a hypothesis: Suppliers who can participate in their
main customer’s advanced technology development, while at the same time maintain business
relationships with a number of other customers, tend to surpass other suppliers in their performance.
6. Statistical Analysis
6.1. Data and Sample
Same as Section 4, this section makes an analysis using data from a questionnaire survey of first-tier
automotive parts suppliers that we conducted in November 2003. This analysis does not strictly test the
hypothesis given in the previous section but enhances the plausibility of the hypothesis.
As mentioned in Section 4, we sent questionnaires to 340 first-tier automotive suppliers, and 150
firms returned responses. However, in testing the hypotheses in Section 6.2, this study excluded samples
lacking indispensable answers to questions for calculating the following variables. As a result, the number
of samples for this analysis decline to n=61.
Here, each components transaction is also treated as the unit of analysis. Suppliers' component
transaction network configurations differ from one component to another (Konno, 2001). As demonstrated
by Han (2002), a transaction mode for one component is different from that for another component, even
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if transactions are made between the same supplier and automaker. Automakers' purchasing policies may
also differ even for the same components (Nobeoka, 1997). Most first-tier suppliers develop and produce
various type components and their groups of customer automakers and customer-by-customer breakdowns
of sales differ from one component to another. Given these various factors, it is considered desirable to
use each component transaction as the unit of analysis in testing the cause-effect relationship assumed in
this paper.
6.2. Descriptions of Variables
The OLS regression analysis has been used for the verification of the hypotheses. To save description
space, details including original questions for the variables used in the following analysis are summarized
in Table 5.
This study used the profit performance of suppliers as the dependent variable to measure supplier
performance (unit of analysis is each component dealings). More specifically, we use “the ratio of
operating profit to sales (OPS)”, the average operating profit divided by average sales for the latest four
years. Although the profit ratio is affected by various factors within and outside a company, however, we
think that it is a permissible indicator, given the objective of our study.
As the first independent variable, “a supplier’s participation in its main customer’s advanced
technology development (PATD)" is used for indicating “the characteristics of relationship between a
supplier and its main customer automaker.” This variable is the same as that used in Section 4.4.
According to discussions in Section 5.2, this variable is expected to have a positive effect on the operating
profit ratio.
As the second independent variable, "customer scope (CS)" is used for indicating “how wide a
supplier's customer base is." This variable is calculated by deducting from 1 the value of a Herfindahl
index, which is calculated as the sum of the squares of automakers' percentage shares of a supplier's
component sales. For example, "customer scope" value for a supplier thadvanced technology
developmentelivered 53% of its total sales of a component to Toyota, 27% to Mazda, 1% to Suzuki, 8% to
Daihatsu and 1% to Fuji is calculated as 0.63 = 1 - 0.37 (0.53２＋0.27２＋0.11２＋0.08２＋0.01２ ). Each
supplier was asked to specify such percentages on a questionnaire survey sheet.
This variable stands between 0 and 1, and increases as "customer scope" widens. According to
discussions in Section 5.3, this variable is also expected to have a positive effect on the operating profit
ratio.
As the third independent variable, we’d like to adopt the interaction term of these two variables -- "a
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supplier’s participation in its main customer’s advanced technology development (PATD)" and "customer
scope (CS)." But if the three variables are simultaneously put into a regression, the multicollinearity
problem occurs. Furthermore, because PATD is a discrete variable and sample size is small, even the
standard method avoiding this “interaction term problem” (the method introduced by Cronbach (1987)12)
has failed to be used. Therefore, the following primitive method has been used: First, CS variables are
divided into two categories -- one for cases where the variable is "larger" than an average value and
another for cases where the variable is "smaller" than an average. Second, since PATD variables are also
divided into two categories -- "participate" and "not participate," four cells are constituted: (PATD, CS) =
("participate (P)," "larger (L)"), ("participate," "smaller (S)"), ("no participation (N)," "larger (L)"), ("no
participation (N)," "smaller (S)"). The first three of the four cells have been adopted as independent
variables. According to discussions in Section 5.4, suppliers' performances are expected to be maximized
when PATD is "P" with CS being "L."
Based on discussions in this section, the following three working hypotheses come out for testing:
Hypothesis 1: PATD has a positive effect on OPS.
Hypothesis 2: CS has a positive effect on OPS.
Hypothesis 3: (PATD, CS) = (“P”, “L”) has a maximum positive effect on OPS.
6.3. Control Variables
Finally, in order to control for other factors that might influence the profit performance of a supplier,
we applied a lot of control variables including components level variables and corporate level variables.
Among component-level variables, this study has first adopted “each supplier's average component
sales (SCS)” for the latest four years (log value) to control scale economies.
Second, “the number of rivals in the component market (NRC)” has been introduced as a variable to
control the effect of the market's competitiveness.
Third, “each supplier's component sales growth (CSG)” for the past four years has been adopted to
control the effect of the profit performance that rises in line with sales growth.
Fourth, this study has adopted a "technology change (TC)" variable for controlling the magnitude of
changes in relevant component technologies, an “external interdependency (EI)” variable for controlling
the external architecture characteristics of relevant components and an "internal interdependency (II)”
12 The method introduced by Cronbach(1987) calls for deducing mean from each dependent variable
(modifying the average into zero) and introducing the two modified variables and their interaction term.
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variable for controlling the internal architecture characteristics of the components13.
Fifth, in order to control the influence by the idiosyncratic nature of each assembler (e.g., differences
in supplier management practices) that could result in gaps in suppliers' performance, dummy variables
regarding "each supplier's respective main customer automakers” have been given to eight of the nine
Japanese automakers. The eight are Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi, Mazda, Suzuki, Daihatsu, Fuji
and Isuzu. No variable has been given to Daihatsu.
Sixth, in addition, this study has adopted the “degree of sub-parts commonality (DSPC)”, the “degree
of production process commonality (DPPC)”, the "rate of in-house made production equipment (RIME)”,
and the "rate of sub-parts outsourcing (RSPO)" as variables to control other factors that could seriously
affect suppliers' profit performances.
This study also has used three corporate-level control variables -- log value of "total sales (TS)", the
"ratio of non-automotive components sales to total sales (RNCS)” and "each component's percentage share
of total sales (PST)."
6.4. Results
Table 6 shows descriptive data and correlation matrices for the variables used in this study other than
dummy variables. It shows that the average ratio of operating profit to sales (OPS) for suppliers in the
sample is 4.5%. Worthy of attention here is a negative relationship between PATD and CS at the 1% level.
This means a trade-off between these two independent variables. Therefore, suppliers that "participate in
their main customer automakers' advanced technology development, while at the same time maintain
business relations with other customers," may be rather exceptional.
Table 7 shows the results of the OLS (ordinary least squares) regression analysis. Model 1 contains
two independent variables (PATD and CS), whereas Model 2 contains three independent variables --
(PATD, CS) = ("P", "L"), ("P", "S"), ("N", "L"). Model 1 (a) and Model 2 (a) contain only
component-level control variables, whereas Model 1 (b) and Model 2 (b) include both component-level
and corporate-level control variables.
First, although not indicated in Table 7, an adjusted R-square of the base model of (a) is 0.17, and an
13 Some variables were adopted to control the technological characteristics of relevant components. First,
components were divided into seven categories (mechanical subassemblies, electronic and electrical
components, mechanically processed components, pressed parts, plastic parts, molding/casting parts and
others) and dummy variables were given to six categories excluding "others." Then, the OLS (ordinary least
squares) regression analysis including "external interdependency" and "international interdependency" as
substitute for the above seven technological categories was conducted. Analysis results indicated few
differences. Therefore, this study here introduces only the models into which the "external interdependency"
and "internal interdependency" have been put.
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adjusted R-square of the base model of (b) is 0.13. Whereas, after adding the independent variables, the
adjusted R-square of each model is bigger than the adjusted R-square for each base model. This result
means that the explanation power of the regression formula improves after each independent variable is
added, suggesting these independent variables used in this analysis have sufficient effects on OPS.
Second, Model 1 shows that PATD has a positive effect on OPS, however, this effect is weak and far
below a significant level. This means that Hypothesis 1 fails to be supported. Although reasons are
unknown, we assume, one reason may be that a supplier's participation in an advanced technology
development project alone requires massive spending that could be recovered through later component
sales. Therefore, in a short term, “participation in an advanced technology development project” alone
may have even negative impact on profit performance.
Third, Model 1 indicates that CS has a strong positive effect on OPS. A significant level of the
variable is p<0.05 for (a) and p<0.01 for (b). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Fourth, Model 2 shows that the variable of (PATD, CS) = (“P”, “L”) has a maximum positive effect
on OPS. The significant level of the variable is p<0.05 for both (a) and (b). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is
supported. For reference, Figure 11 shows the number of suppliers and the partial regression coefficients
for four cells.
The statistical analysis in this section indicates: (1) that a supplier's participation in its main customer
automaker's advanced technology development alone is not necessarily advantageous for improving the
supplier's profit performance, (2) that a supplier’s performance is improved through business relations
with multiple automakers, and (3) that a supplier that participates in its main customer's advanced
technology development, while at the same time maintains business relations with multiple other
automakers, tend to outperform other suppliers who don’t have do this. In short, both relationships
simultaneously are necessary for suppliers.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and the Correlation Matrix of Major Variables
Variable AV SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 OPS 0.04 0.05 1.00
2 PATD 0.69 0.46 -0.09 1.00
3 CS 0.40 0.29 0.34 -0.24 1.00
4 SCS 8.47 1.69 0.02 0.26 0.31 1.00
5 NRC 0.15 0.40 -0.03 0.05 -0.16 0.02 1.00
6 CSG 8.92 12.59 -0.07 -0.14 -0.19 -0.15 0.02 1.00
7 TC 3.46 0.77 -0.35 0.32 -0.23 0.06 0.12 -0.17 1.00
8 EI -4.59 3.01 -0.12 0.38 -0.12 0.27 0.05 -0.01 0.22 1.00
9 II 6.75 1.64 0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.21 0.07 0.06 1.00
10 DSPC 0.27 0.22 -0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.07 -0.26 0.06 1.00
11 DPPC 0.41 0.29 -0.16 0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.04 -0.19 0.03 -0.12 0.04 0.47 1.00
12 RIME 0.50 0.32 -0.06 -0.05 0.09 -0.16 0.03 -0.01 -0.21 0.04 0.13 0.10 -0.07 1.00
13 RSPO 0.33 0.28 -0.29 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.05 -0.16 0.15 0.00 -0.03 1.00
14 TS 10.22 1.66 -0.04 0.16 0.22 0.78 0.04 -0.23 0.12 0.33 0.05 -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 0.08 1.00
15 RNCS 0.23 0.29 -0.02 -0.21 0.23 -0.17 -0.15 0.18 -0.07 -0.10 -0.15 -0.08 -0.10 0.04 0.29 0.04 1.00
16 PST 0.29 0.26 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.44 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.26 1.00
（Note）If the absolute value of a correlation coefficient≧0.24 then it is significant at the 1% level，and if the absolute value is ≧0.17 then it is significant at the 5% level.
Table 4: Explanations of Variables
Variables Calculation method Relevant question
Ratio of operating profit
to sales (OPS)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify the ratio of operating profit to sales for Component X at your company （average for the latest four
years, %)?
Customer scope （CS)
This variable is calculated by deducting
from 1 the value of a Herfindahl index,
which is calculated as the sum of the
squares of automakers' percentage
shares of a supplier's component sales.
Q: Will you specify all Japanese automakers' percentage shares of your company's Component X sales (for the latest
fiscal year) ? These percentage figures should add up to 100%.
Average component
sales (log value) (SCS)
Based on a response to the right
question.
Q: Will you specify sales of Component X at your company (an average for the latest four years, in millions of yen)?
Number of rivals in the ｃ
omponent market (NRC)
A response to the right question.
Q: How many companies including your company manufacture Component X? （Latest number of companies）
Component sales growth
（CSG)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify the sales growth for Component X at your company (the average annual growth rate for the four
latest years, %)?
Degree of sub-parts
commonality (DSPC)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify the degree of commonality of sub-parts for Component X (on a cost basis, %)?
Degree of production
processes commonality
(DPPC)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify the percentage of the common portion of all production processes for Component X (on a man-
hour basis, %)?
Rate of in-house made
production equipment
(RIME)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify the ratio of in-house made production equipment to the total of major production equipments for
Component X (based on the number of equipments, %)?
Rate of sub-parts
outsourcing (RSPO)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify the rate of outsourcing for sub-parts for Component X (on a cost basis, %)?
Main customer dummy
Dummy variables regarding suppliers'
main customer automakers are given to
eight Japanese automakers excluding
Daihatsu. (The samples (n=61) did not
include any supplier that has a main
customer other than the nine Japanese
automakers.)
Q: What is your main customer automaker for Component X? (Circle one company)
1. Toyota 2. Nissan 3. Honda 4. Mitsubishi 5. Mazda 6. Suzuki 7. Daihatsu 8. Fuji 9. Isuzu 10. Hino 11. Nissan
Diesel 12. Others
Total sales (log value)
（TS)
Based on responses to the two right
questions.
Q: Will you specify sales of Component X (the annual average for the latest four years, in millions of yen)?
Q: Will you specify Component X's share of your company's total sales (the annual average for the latest four years,
%)?
ratio of non-automotive
components sales to
total sales (RNCS)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify the ratio of sales other than the auto industry to total sales (on a sales basis, the average for the
latest four years, %)?
each component's
percentage share of
total sales (PST)
A response to the right question is
divided by 100.
Q: Will you specify Component X's share of total sales at your company (the average for the latest four years, %)?
（Note）Descriptions are omitted for variables covered by Table 2.
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Figure 11: OLS Regression Analysis Results (n=61)
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Table 6: OLS Regression Analysis Results (n=61)
Model
Independent variable
β ｔ β ｔ β ｔ β ｔ
PATD 0.02 1.41 0.02 1.38
CS 0.07 2.65 ** 0.07 2.74 ***
P－L 0.07 2.38 ** 0.08 2.59 **
P－S 0.04 1.33 0.05 1.65
N－L 0.06 1.95 * 0.07 2.29 **
SPS -0.01 -1.94 * -0.02 1.19 -0.01 -1.99 * -0.01 -1.07
NRC 0.00 -0.50 0.00 0.26 0.00 -0.45 0.00 -0.53
CSG 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.04
TC -0.02 -2.03 ** -0.02 2.01 * -0.02 -1.87 * -0.02 -1.85 *
EI 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.21
II 0.01 1.57 0.01 1.43 0.00 1.24 0.00 1.08
DSPC 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.55 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.22
DPPC -0.05 -1.95 * -0.05 2.06 ** -0.04 -1.78 * -0.05 -1.97 *
RIME -0.04 -1.99 * -0.04 1.83 * -0.04 -1.98 * -0.04 -2.00 *
RSPO -0.04 -1.55 -0.04 1.34 -0.04 -1.60 -0.04 -1.40
Toyota 0.08 2.17 ** 0.08 2.25 ** 0.08 2.14 ** 0.08 2.32 **
Nissan 0.07 2.04 ** 0.08 2.13 ** 0.07 1.77 * 0.07 1.98 *
Honda 0.08 2.20 ** 0.09 2.36 ** 0.08 1.96 * 0.08 2.12 **
Mitsubishi 0.03 0.77 0.03 0.72 0.03 0.60 0.03 0.65
Mazda 0.07 1.60 0.07 1.67 0.07 1.68 0.08 1.79 *
Suzuki 0.05 0.88 0.05 0.75 0.05 0.88 0.06 0.93
Fuji Heavy 0.05 1.08 0.05 1.05 0.04 0.86 0.04 0.85
Isuzu 0.07 1.54 0.08 1.84 * 0.07 1.57 0.08 1.78 *
TS 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.08
RNCS -0.02 0.96 0.00 0.01
PST 0.04 0.78 0.05 0.92
Constant 0.07 0.96 0.08 0.90 0.09 1.11 0.10 1.14
Ｆ value
Adjusted R 2
N
* for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, *** for p<0.01
6161 61 61
1.79 1.65
0.22 0.21
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OPS OPS
１(a) １(b)
OPSOPS
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
M
a
in
c
u
s
to
m
e
r
d
u
m
m
y
1.78
0.230.24
1.97
 Hosei University Repository
36
7. Conclusion and Discussions
7.1. Cooperation in Advanced technology Development and Inter-company Relations
The above analyses indicated that Japanese automakers and their respective suppliers have expanded
their collaboration into the development of advanced technologies over the past decade.
In the Japanese automotive market, the automakers need to realize sufficient functionality and
product quality at a low price. Furthermore, for example, the automakers need to realize not only the basic
drive, turn, stop, and gasoline mileage functions but also user-friendliness, huge baggage area, airbags,
active safety, and CO2/NOX reduction features. Thus, today, automotive technology development races
have become more and more complicated.
For most of the automotive components, technological innovations are rapid, including development
and utilization of new materials (particularly a shift from metals to plastics) and advanced IT technologies,
miniaturization, and reducing weight of a vehicle. In addition, a shift has made rapid progress to
“modules” and “systems” over the recent years. The new design concepts for automotive components
have been proposed one after another and some have been put into practice.
Under these circumstances, automakers have been prompted to cooperate with their suppliers for the
development of advanced technologies (e.g., Konno and Okuda, 2005). Such conditions have apparently
exerted a great impact on business relations between automakers and their suppliers.
Furthermore, the analysis in Section 6 indicates a supplier who participates in their main customers’
advanced technological development and has broader scope of business relationships tends to outperform
other suppliers who don’t have this. In other words, it is significant for suppliers to broaden customer
scope, but if with the sacrifice of existing relation with the main customer, it is not a preferable option.
In fact, suppliers face many advanced technology issues which can only be dealt with in
collaboration with automakers. Therefore, it is crucial for suppliers to prove important in the eyes of main
customers and gain more access to confidential and important information on technology and needs, or
join co-development projects on new technology.
However, this alone will not be sufficient. “Participation in an advanced technological development
project” alone means “pure investments” that can only be recovered through later component sales. In
addition, if suppliers reserve the number of customers, they could get caught in “learning bias” or become
too dependent on specific customer company and lose the attitude of developing and exercising their own
strategies. Moreover, in order to manage transactions among different firms, suppliers must be able to
adapt the technology or product platform of a specific product to meet different customers’ demands. Such
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competence would only develop, and improve, through learning by doing in numbers of actual dealings
with customers. Thus, it is crucial for a supplier not only to participate in its main customers' advanced
technology development projects, while at the same time broadening transactions with other various
customers.
7.2. Progressive practice of Toyota’s Suppliers and Future Problems
Furthermore, even amid this general trend, our findings indicate that Toyota has progressed ahead of
other automakers. Toyota has cooperated with major suppliers from the advanced technology development
stage more aggressively than other automakers. Its quantitative achievements in this regard are far more
than those of the other automakers. Toyota has also proactively coordinated the joint style advanced
technology development projects that include two or more suppliers (which include horizontal
collaboration between suppliers).
Since automotive technologies have been advancing rapidly, Toyota’s excellent production and
product development operations cannot guarantee its future competitiveness. If it fails to develop
advanced technologies, even Toyota could be outperformed by the others. Given Toyota’s recent success,
it seems that the network that Toyota has constructed for collaboration with suppliers in the development
of advanced technologies might have contributed to the firm’s international competitive edge.
The progressiveness of the network that Toyota has built for collaboration with suppliers in the
development of advanced technologies indicates the firm’s excellent management of collaboration. This
paper does not address details of automakers’ management of collaboration with suppliers in the
development of advanced technologies. However, this is a very interesting theme.
In the future, multifaceted surveys should be conducted to examine the management of collaboration
in advanced technology development.
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